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Gender equality and fertility intentions revisited: 
Evidence from Finland 
Anneli Miettinen1 
Stuart Basten2 
Anna Rotkirch3 
Abstract 
Stimulated by the recent debate on gender roles and men’s fertility behaviour (Puur et 
al. 2008; Westoff and Higgins 2009; Goldscheider, Oláh and Puur 2010), we present 
evidence from Finland as a country well into the second phase of the so-called gender 
revolution. We examine how gender role attitudes relate to childbearing intentions at 
the onset of family life, intentions to have many (3 or more) children, and high personal 
fertility ideals among low-parity men and women. Gender equality attitudes are 
measured for both the public and the domestic sphere and the influence of work and 
family orientation is controlled for. Finding signs of a U-shaped association among 
men, we conclude that both traditional and egalitarian attitudes raise men’s expected 
fertility compared to men with intermediate gender attitudes and independently of 
family values. Among Finnish women the impact of gender attitudes is smaller and 
more ambiguous. 
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2 World Population Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria and 
Department of Social Policy and Intervention, University of Oxford. 
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1. Introduction  
Gender and gender equity represent an important challenge for fertility research. 
Gender shapes reproductive strategies, be it through mate choice and parental 
investment (Trivers 1972), power relations within the household (Folbre 1983), or more 
general notions of gender ideology (Philipov 2008). Differing views exist as to whether 
increased gender equity will make people wish for more or fewer children. Historically, 
traditional family arrangements have correlated with higher numbers of children. 
During the first demographic transition to smaller families women became much more 
equal with men. However, at the same time the provision of child care from kin 
diminished and parents were increasingly removed from the family sphere, intensifying 
the stress of women’s double burden of combining wage and domestic work 
(Goldscheider 2000). The second demographic transition witnessed even smaller family 
sizes while recent years have seen a recuperation of fertility in the most developed 
societies, which also score high in gender equity (Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009). 
Several studies predict that fertility will increase as gender equity within families 
advances. For instance, influential articles by Peter McDonald (2000a and 2000b) 
proposed that the imbalance between high gender equity in institutions such as 
education and market employment and lower level of equity in family life have 
contributed to low fertility in advanced countries. Once the ‘gender revolution’ is 
completed fertility should rise (see also Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996; Puur et al. 
2008; Goldscheider, Oláh, and Puur 2010). This may indeed be one explanation for the 
recent reversal in fertility decline (Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009). However, the 
actual impact of family gender equity and egalitarian values on fertility is unclear, 
although it is crucial for understanding demographic prospects and “the male role in 
Europe” in the 21st century (Puur et al. 2008). 
Of special interest in European demographic research has been the relationship 
between the fertility intentions of men, women, and couples, and actual childbearing 
(Oláh 2003; Puur et al. 2008; Philipov 2009; Westoff and Higgins 2009). In particular 
the role children play in men’s lives and the impact of gender equity on fatherhood has 
been discussed in numerous recent studies (Thomson, McDonald, and Bumpass 1990; 
Thomson 1997; Thomson and Hoem 1998; Rosina and Testa 2009). Egalitarian women 
can reasonably be expected to opt for either ‘no families’ or ‘new families’ 
(Goldsheider and Waite 1991). If their double burden is alleviated – due to work and 
family reconciliation policies or due to men acquiring a larger share of household tasks 
– a positive influence of gender equality on women’s childbearing prospects can be 
presumed. But why should gender egalitarian attitudes increase men’s fertility 
aspirations, since equality means more, not less domestic work for them? Both indirect 
and direct explanations have been suggested. If egalitarian men are more willing to 
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share domestic and childcare tasks, this may increase their partners’ desire to have 
children. Egalitarian men may also attach more importance and meaning to family life 
and fatherhood than traditional men do. Hence, ‘doing family’ or strong family 
orientation of egalitarian men could compensate for the costs of domestic and caring 
responsibilities and increase men’s fertility intentions (e.g. Goldscheider 2000; Puur et 
al. 2008:1887). However, not all egalitarian men are highly family-oriented, while men 
with traditional gender attitudes may also prioritize family life. 
This article is stimulated by the recent debate on the relationship between 
traditional and egalitarian gender roles and fertility, focusing particularly on men’s 
attitudes to gender equality and having children (Puur et al. 2008; Westhoff and Higgins 
2009; Goldsheider, Oláh, and Puur 2010). We present evidence from Finland as a 
country with a relatively high level of gender equity in both public and private life and 
thus well into the second phase of the gender revolution. The relationship between 
egalitarian attitudes and fertility intentions of women and men with no children or only 
one child is investigated. We examine how egalitarian attitudes relate to childbearing 
intentions at the onset of family life, intentions to have many (3 or more) children, and 
high personal fertility ideals among men and women with no or only one child. Men’s 
responses are compared with data on women, as information about both sexes is needed 
in order to understand the link between gender relations and fertility. 
 
 
2. Previous findings on gender equity and fertility  
Attitudes to gender equality in low fertility societies have been claimed to correlate 
with higher numbers of children, both on the social and individual level, but the 
existing evidence is somewhat contradictory. The impact of gender equality typically 
varies by sex and parity, depending on the national and social context and on 
measurements of gender equality.  
Kaufman (2000), in analyzing the 1987/1998 and 1992/1994 waves of the United 
States National Survey of Families and Households, found that while egalitarian 
women are less likely to intend or actually have a child than traditional women, for men 
the opposite is the case. However, Torr, and Short (2004), examining the same data, 
found evidence of a U-shaped curve in the predicted probabilities of a second birth by 
division of household labour at the individual level. Here, therefore, both ‘traditional’ 
couples, where women contributed most to domestic chores, and ‘modern’ couples, 
who shared domestic tasks more equally, were more likely to have a second child than 
the intermediate group of ‘partial-sharers’. 
Studies derived from the Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS) conducted 
in fourteen European countries between 2000-2003 concluded that men with more 
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egalitarian attitudes toward gender equity have higher fertility intentions. Puur et al. 
(2008:1898), after controlling for several demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics, found that “egalitarian attitudes tend to be associated with higher 
fertility intentions” as well as with higher realized fertility in all studied eight countries 
(Austria, Estonia, East and West Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and 
Poland). In a more in-depth regional analysis of the PPAS data for Austria, Tazi-Preve 
et al. (2004) found that a traditional division of household labour clearly diminished 
people’s wish to have a(nother) baby, with the inverse being the case in more 
egalitarian partnerships. 
On the other hand, using panel data from Gender and Generations Survey (GGS) 
in Hungary, Spéder and Kapitány (2009) found that traditional gender role orientation 
significantly correlated with having a second and third child among both men and 
women, while no relation was found between egalitarian attitudes and having the first 
child. A study by Philipov (2008), using the same PPAS data set as Puur et al. (2008) 
and with almost the same set of countries, looked at several dimensions of gender 
egalitarian attitudes but found no clear association between them and fertility 
aspirations. Only attitudes concerning the ultimate societal role of women and men 
correlated with intentions to become a parent, while attitudes towards working mothers 
and meaning of paid work for women had no impact at all.  
In Spain and Italy, data from the European Community Household Survey 
suggests that where fathers play a substantial role in care activities with the first-born of 
young couples, the transition to a second birth is faster (Cooke 2003). Similarly, using 
the Italian ISTAT Survey on Births, Pinnelli and Fiori found that fathers’ participation 
in domestic labour and childcare significantly increased the intention to have a second 
child for working women. This factor had no influence on intentions to have a third 
child or on the fertility intentions of non-working women (Pinnelli and Fiori 2008).  
Completing this corpus of ambiguous evidence, Westoff and Higgins performed a 
quasi-parallel analysis to Puur et al. using the European/World Values Survey (EWVS), 
extracting data from seven of the eight countries examined by Puur et al. but focussing 
on childbearing behaviour. They observed similar results with regard to the geography 
of attitudes towards gender equality. However, they found that while “fertility is higher 
at the egalitarian end of the scale in Puur et al. …for every country without exception, 
we found an opposite relationship” (Westoff and Higgins 2009:68). Indeed, upon 
analysis of an expanded data-set of all developed countries in the EWVS, Westoff and 
Higgins “encountered a statistically significant negative relationship between 
egalitarian attitudes of men and the number of children ever born for 17 of the 31 
countries”, with the slope of the other 14 countries also being uniformly negative even 
if not statistically significant (Westoff and Higgins 2009:70). 
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Different measures of fertility further complicate the picture. For instance, the 
recent discrepancy between the results obtained by Puur and his colleagues (2008) and 
those obtained by Westoff and Higgins (2009) can be due to the former focussing 
mainly on the expected fertility and the latter looking at the achieved fertility. The 
terminology is also often unclear. Egalitarianism is typically equated with feminism 
(King and King 1986); support for polarised gender roles is often called traditional, 
while support for equal gender roles is labelled modern. This is problematic, since the 
content of "traditional" may vary and all that is “modern” is not gender equal (Therborn 
2004). 
Finally, a crucial reason for conflicting evidence is due to different measures of 
gender equity (Goldsheider, Oláh, and Puur 2010). It is not clear what aspect of gender 
relations is the most critical considering fertility behaviour, or how societal context 
shapes the association. While some measures of gender equity are related to fertility in 
some societies, other aspects of gender relations may be more relevant in others. Also 
the formulations of survey questions vary (Westoff and Higgins 2009:72.) This 
dilemma is found at the core of the debate between Puur et al. (2008) and Westoff and 
Higgins (2009). Puur et al. study three statements about men as fathers and family 
members: “It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and the 
woman goes out to work”, “Family life often suffers because men concentrate too much 
on their work”, and “For a man the job should be more important than the family.” As 
they stress, the response to these statements is likely to relate directly to men’s choices 
in family life. However, the focus means that they may measure attitudes to child care 
or the strength of family values, rather than gender equality per se. Westoff and Higgins 
(2009:67-68) looked at five other questions, related to gender equality in education and 
the labour market (three questions), the importance of motherhood for women, and the 
acceptability of single motherhood (one question each). The advantage of these 
questions is that they reflect equality more broadly. Their obvious disadvantage, 
however, is that they do not address fatherhood or gender relations within the family at 
all. In our study we overcome these limitations by measuring attitudes to gender 
equality both in the public and the domestic spheres and by controlling for the influence 
of work versus family orientation on gender equity. 
 
 
3. Gender equity and fertility in Finland  
Finland rather stands out in a European context with its combination of high numbers of 
full-time working women and relatively high fertility. When working time is taken into 
account, Finnish women’s labour force participation rates are among the highest in 
Europe (OECD Labour Force Statistics 2010). The labour force participation of Finnish 
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women in fertile ages is close to that of men and the educational attainment of women 
is higher than that of men in all working age groups (Statistics Finland 2010a; Statistics 
Finland 2004).  
Reconciliation of work and family has been one of the central targets of Finnish 
family policy. The mother or father can stay at home with an earnings-related allowance 
until the baby is about eleven months old. An extensive and affordable day care system 
was developed during the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s. All families with 
below school-age children are entitled to a place in a kindergarten on demand, 
irrespective of the employment status of the parents. If parents with a below-three-year-
old child do not wish to choose public day care, either of the parents can take home care 
leave with a flat allowance rate. Home care leave is very popular and currently almost 
80% of families with children below three years of age use it at least for some period of 
time (Lammi-Taskula 2007). 
While social policy has considerably relieved women’s double burden by 
providing care arrangements for children and the elderly, the gender revolution is by no 
means complete in Finnish families. Men have gradually increased their participation in 
domestic work and especially in child care, but women continue to perform a larger 
share of household chores. In many cases the more equal division at home is a result of 
well-educated or younger women reducing or outsourcing housework, not of men doing 
more. (Niemi and Pääkkönen 2001; Miettinen 2008.) Although parents have been 
entitled to share parental leaves as they wish since 1985, fathers’ use of child care leave 
has started to increase only recently, particularly after the introduction of father-specific 
provisions (the so called ‘daddy-month’) (Lammi-Taskula 2007). 
How do Finnish gender role attitudes appear in a European context? We used data 
from the European Value Survey in 1999 (also employed in Westoff and Higgins 2009) 
to compare 30 European countries. Table 1 shows the ranking of a summary index of 
gender equity attitudes based on seven items measuring different aspects of gender 
roles. According to this measure Finland as well as the other Nordic countries belonged 
to the top five in men’s attitudes (Table 1, includes only top 13 countries).  
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Table 1: Country measures for gender equity from the European Value 
Survey, 1999 
Distribution (%) of men in each category 
Mean  
(1=traditional attitudes, 
4=egalitarian attitudes)  
Traditional Intermediate Egalitarian Men Women 
Denmark 11 24 65 2.6 2.7 
Sweden 15 33 52 2.6 2.9 
Iceland 7 40 54 2.5 2.8 
Netherlands 12 35 53 2.5 2.7 
Finland 12 39 49 2.5 2.6 
Spain 17 36 46 2.5 2.5 
Ireland 19 43 38 2.4 2.5 
Slovenia 23 40 37 2.4 2.6 
Great Britain 27 34 40 2.4 2.5 
Belgium 29 32 39 2.3 2.5 
Germany 31 32 37 2.3 2.5 
Croatia 30 34 37 2.3 2.4 
France 33 34 32 2.3 2.4 
 
Notes: European Value Survey 1999, men and women aged 20-69 years. Gender equity: Cronbach alfa .59. 
Variables: 1. When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women;  
2. Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary;  
3. If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent, but she doesn’t want to have a stable relationship with a 
man, do you approve or disapprove;  
4. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does 
not work;  
5. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works;  
6. A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children;  
7. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay. 
 
Although far from absolute, equality Finland and the other Nordic countries can 
thus be said to be well into the second phase of the gender revolution. Finland is also a 
country with comparatively high fertility ideals and numbers. Voluntary childlessness is 
low, and few Finns favour the one-child family (Miettinen and Rotkirch 2008). The 
mean ideal family size among Finnish young women is well above the European 
average: almost every second woman wanted to have three or more children – more 
than in any other country in Europe. Indeed, the ‘gap’ between desired and actual 
fertility is highest in Finland among the European countries (Goldstein, Lutz, and Testa 
2003), mostly due to high levels of involuntary childlessness. 
In a European perspective Finland has high numbers of childless men and women 
but also more parents with three or more children. Of today’s 35 year-old Finns, one in 
four women and two in five men are childless. While two children remain the social 
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expectation and median number of children, today’s growing fertility rates are largely 
due to an increase in higher parities. Indeed, the proportion of families who have at 
least three children has been growing since the 1970s. Socio-economic position is 
related to men’s but not to women’s numbers of children, so that men with higher 
education and income are less likely to remain childless and more likely to have several 
children. Childlessness is most common among the highest educated but also among the 
least educated women, while the numbers of children among mothers is not strongly 
related to educational level (Miettinen and Rotkirch 2008). 
The total fertility level in Finland has fluctuated around 1.8-1.9 since the end of 
1980s, being 1.85 in 2008 (Statistics Finland 2010b). The adjusted TFR for Finland for 
2005-2007 was 1.93, while the completed cohort fertility for women born in 1968 was 
1.90 children per woman (VID/IIASA 2010). Thus the gradual increase in age at first 
birth has not been followed by decreasing fertility and the 2000s witnessed a slight 
increase in period TFR. This recuperation of fertility has been attributed to high levels 
of development, including high gender equality and probably the impact of the family-
friendly social policies outlined above (Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009). However, 
it is unknown how structural or attitudinal equality of Finns interact with their 
childbearing behaviour. 
 
 
4. Data, methods, and research questions  
The Finnish Well-being and Social Relationships Survey (Hyvinvointi ja ihmissuhteet-
kysely) was conducted by the Family Federation of Finland in 2008 among 7000 25-44 
year-old men and women who had no children or only one child, and received a 44% 
response rate (Miettinen and Rotkirch 2008). The study focussed on low parity adults in 
order to better capture factors related to the postponement of parenthood and decreasing 
fertility. Although our data exclude parents with two or more children we believe it to 
suffice to investigate the link between gender attitudes and fertility intentions. Partly 
due to the postponement of parenthood, childless or one-child adults represent about 
60% of women and 70% of men in this age group (25-44 year olds) in Finland. The 
questionnaire asked about various aspects of personal and marital well-being, attitudes 
and expectations towards work, family, and social relationships, as well as childbearing 
ideals and intentions. In the present paper we restrict the analysis to 25-39 year-old men 
and women. 
Fertility intentions are good predictors of further childbearing, although their 
validity decreases when moving from expectations and plans concerning the immediate 
future towards more abstract fertility desires (Rindfuss, Morgan, and Swicegood 1988; 
Schoen et al 1999; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003). The factors influencing fertility 
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intentions can also explain actual childbearing choices (Rindfuss, Morgan, and 
Swicegood 1988). We study the intention to have a(nother) child (the intention to 
become a parent among childless respondents and the intention to have a next child 
among one-child parents), the intention to have many children (intentions to have three 
or more children), and the ideal of having many children (having three or more children 
as a personal ideal). We expect to find a link between gender attitudes and fertility 
intentions during the critical phases of family formation in Finland; that is, regarding 
first the decision to become a parent, and second regarding an orientation to above-
average fertility (measured as the intention to have more than two children). 
Fertility intentions were obtained by asking if the respondent planned to have 
a(nother) child sometime in the future (No/Don’t know/Yes/Currently pregnant or 
Partner pregnant). Respondents who did not know were combined with those who 
answered ‘no’. Pregnant couples were excluded. The intended (expected) number of 
children was obtained by asking how many children the respondent planned to have 
altogether (including current children). Fertility ideals were measured by asking 
respondents to tell their personal ideal number of children. 
We measured gender equality with nine questions relating both to gender equality 
in the public and in the private sphere and to men as breadwinners, spouses, and fathers. 
We included measures of family and work orientation as separate dimensions in order 
to study if gender attitudes have an independent impact on fertility desires after 
controlling for these two factors. 
‘Gender role attitudes’ were measured with nine statements:  
 
1. Companies and the economy in general would benefit if there were more 
women in managerial positions, 
2. Men are more committed to their work than women (reversed),  
3. In general, men are more suitable for leading political positions than 
women (reversed),  
4. Men should do half of the housework, 
5. Men should always bear the main responsibility for the livelihood of the 
family (reversed), 
6. Equality between the sexes has already been achieved in Finland 
(reversed), 
7. Nobody can take care of a small child as well as his/her mother does 
(reversed),  
8. A father can take care of a small child as well as the mother does, 
9. In a good relationship, it is important that partners share the responsibility 
for the livelihood of the family. 
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Each answer was categorized with a Likert scale of five increments from 
‘completely agree’ to ‘completely disagree’, and an additional category for not having 
an opinion. Some questions were reversed so that the higher score of the composite 
variable indicates more equal attitudes towards gender roles. For the analysis the gender 
ideology measure was divided into three categories: traditional, intermediate, and 
egalitarian gender role attitudes. We used somewhat different breaking points for men 
and women to obtain three groups, with at least a fourth of the respondents falling into 
the extreme positions.4 
The items we chose to measure gender equity partly differ from the ones used by 
Puur et al. (2008) and Westoff and Higgins (2009). In particular, compared to the 
gender attitude measure used by the latter, our variable included several items 
considering men’s and women’s roles in the family. We agree with Goldscheider et al. 
(2010) that questions which specifically address family roles are more important when 
we consider childbearing decisions than, for example, questions relating to women’s 
position in society in general. However, as we also believe the latter is important when 
measuring gender equity, we included both these aspects in the composite variable. We 
also analysed the impact of the family and public gender role dimensions separately by 
separating attitudes towards women’s role in the public sphere from attitudes towards 
gender roles in the family but found no marked differences between them among 
women. The strength of the separate attitude measure varied somewhat among men, 
depending on the fertility dimension we were analysing, but the direction of the impact 
was similar to that of the composite variable. We chose to use the composite variable 
for simplicity and because of the higher initial validity of the composite measure 
(Cronbach’s α .67), indicating that it does capture latent attitudes towards gender roles. 
We controlled for other ideational factors associated with childbearing including 
work orientation, family orientation, number of siblings, and religiousness. We wanted 
to distinguish between the contribution of family orientation and that of gender 
equality, as strong family orientation may reflect traditional attitudes which do not 
overlap with gender equity attitudes, and both may contribute separately to men’s and 
women’s motivations as parents. In a similar fashion we separate work orientation from 
gender attitudes. 
‘Family orientation’ was created from five items concerning the centrality of 
children for the family and personal well-being (Cronbach’s α .60), namely:  
 
4 For men, the cut-off levels were traditional=1-3.00, in-between=3.01-3.75 and modern=3.76-5. For women, 
1-3.59; 3.60-4.24 and 4.25-5. 
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1. Only children make a family, 
2. A person who doesn’t have children is selfish,  
3. The relationship with your own children is the closest relationship one 
can have,  
4. One can be perfectly happy even if one doesn’t have children (reversed),  
5. It is your duty towards society to have children. 
 
‘Work orientation’ was created from five items concerning the importance of work 
and career in life and commitment to work (Cronbach’s α .76). These items were:  
 
1. The most important thing in my life concern my work, 
2. Work has a very central place in my life, 
3. Career advancement is very important to me, 
4. I am very committed to my work, 
5. My goals in life are mostly related to work. 
 
Work orientation was then divided into three classes measuring low, intermediate, 
or high work orientation. 
Religiousness was estimated by asking “How important is religion in your life?” 
on a four-grade scale. Number of siblings was reported by respondents in the question 
“I had ___ siblings in my childhood home.” Both religiosity and number of siblings are 
known to correlate with higher fertility. The effect of childhood family size on adult 
fertility may follow different pathways including inherited genetic predispositions, but 
here we understand it to be a mainly environmental and ideational influence. 
Independent variables controlling for structural factors include age, partnership 
status (no union/in union), number of children (0/1), education (divided into lower 
vocational or less, middle level vocational, and university level education), and 
household income. In two-adult households the income of both partners were combined 
and divided by two. Descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in  
Appendix I. 
We used logistic regression models to examine each childbearing intention 
separately among men and women by parities. The first set produces the effect of all 
independent variables separately. Model I produces the combined effect of all ideational 
variables and Model II the effect of all structural variables. The third model provides 
the combined effect of all structural and ideational variables including gender equity. 
Table 3 in the text displays the values of the coefficients for gender attitudes retrieved 
from the model including all variables. The logistic regression tables can be found in 
Appendix II. 
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We study three research questions:  
 
Q1. How do traditional and egalitarian gender attitudes relate to men’s and 
women’s intentions to have children in Finland? 
Q2. How is the impact of gender attitudes related to the fertility dimension under 
study (decisions concerning the near future versus more abstract ideals and 
intentions)? 
Q3 Do gender egalitarian attitudes correlate with fertility intentions independently 
from family or work orientation? 
 
We expect any link between egalitarian attitudes and fertility intentions to be more 
apparent in the critical steps in family formation in today’s Finland, that is, first the 
intention to have children at all, and then the intention to have many children. 
 
 
5. Descriptive results  
More than every second childless Finn aged 25-39 intends to have a child in the future 
(Table 2), among one-child parents, over two thirds expect their family to grow. The 
descriptive statistics show no clear overall relationship between gender role attitudes 
and intentions to have a child. 
Egalitarian childless men intend to have a first child and to have three or more 
children somewhat more often than other men. Among men with one child, however, 
traditional men intend to have a second and a third child more often than other men. 
Concerning the intended overall number of children, men with traditional attitudes 
score highest among both childless men and one-child men. However, the association of 
gender equity with men’s fertility intentions appears slightly U-shaped among childless 
men, since egalitarian childless men exhibit the second highest expectations. 
On the other hand, concerning the ideal personal family, size decreases with more 
egalitarian attitudes. 
There is a slight trend for egalitarian women to plan more children. Childless 
women with traditional gender values have high personal fertility ideals but, 
interestingly, low intentions to actually have children. Women with intermediate gender 
attitudes plan most strongly to have a child and also to have many children. By contrast 
mothers of one child exhibit a U-shape effect in their intended numbers of children, so 
that egalitarian mothers report both the highest ideal and intended number of children 
among all female respondents. 
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Table 2: Intention to have a(nother) child, intended number of children  
and personal ideal number of children by gender role attitudes,  
Finnish 0 and 1 parity men and women aged 25-39 years,  
Finnish Well-being survey 2008 
  Intends to have a(nother) child, %
Intends to have 3+ 
children, % 
Personal ideal 3+ 
children, % 
Personal ideal 
number of 
children, mean 
Intended number 
of children, mean 
Traditional 52 20 28 2.17 1.90 
Intermediate 51 15 17 1.84 1.59 
Men,  
0 children 
(N 479) Egalitarian 55 23 21 1.82 1.70 
Traditional 69 39 38 2.39 2.41 
Intermediate 68 19 23 2.16 2.10 
Men,  
1 child 
(N 497) Egalitarian 67 27 22 2.09 2.11 
Traditional 52 17 27 1.95 1.58 
Intermediate 67 24 25 1.94 1.85 
Women,  
0 children 
(N 570) Egalitarian 58 20 25 1.80 1.66 
Traditional 66 32 32 2.28 2.25 
Intermediate 64 31 30 2.23 2.18 
Women,  
1 child 
(N 591) Egalitarian 64 34 35 2.39 2.34 
 
On the basis of these descriptive statistics, traditional gender ideology slightly 
increases childbearing intentions and ideals among Finnish men. However, egalitarian 
childless men have higher fertility intentions than do intermediate men, and intend to 
have three or more children more often than traditional men. Partnership status may 
partly explain these different associations between fertility intentions and gender 
equality. Below we explore how childbearing ideals and intentions relate to gender 
ideology when we control for partnership and other factors. 
 
 
6. Regression section  
We used logistic regression analysis to examine whether gender role attitudes have an 
impact on fertility intentions when controlling for other factors known to influence 
childbearing. The results of the logistic regression analysis for men and women are 
summarised in Table 3 below. The complete logistic regression tables, including all 
models, can be found in Appendix Tables A2 and A3. The effects of the variables on 
the intention to have a first child (among childless respondents) and on the intention to 
have a second child (among one-child parents) are shown in Appendix Table A2. 
Appendix Table A3 presents the intention to have three or more children as well as the 
personal ideal to have a large family. In what follows we focus on the impact of gender 
attitudes in explaining men’s fertility intentions.  
On the whole, gender role attitudes were not significantly associated with the 
intention to have the first child once we control for other factors. The effect on the 
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intention to have a second child is even less marked, as we expected (Table 3). Finnish 
parents exhibit a strong motivation to have a sister or brother to the first child and this 
appears to override other ideational motives for childbearing. 
Descriptive statistics (Table 2 above) showed that gender role attitudes had a 
slightly U-shaped association with childbearing intentions among childless men but an 
inverse U-shape association among childless women. Multivariate analysis of the 
intention to have the first child provides some support for this observation.  
Among men both traditional and egalitarian gender role attitudes are positively 
associated with the intention to start childbearing when compared to men holding 
intermediate attitudes, although the result does not reach statistical significance. The 
impact of egalitarian attitudes is even more accentuated, if again not significantly, when 
other variables are included in the model (Table A2).  
However, there was a clear and significant impact of gender attitudes concerning 
more abstract fertility desires, or the ideals and intentions to have three or more children 
(Tables 3 and A3). Traditional gender attitudes increase men’s 3+ fertility intentions 
and ideals. Egalitarian men do not differ significantly from traditional men, while 
intermediate attitudes significantly diminish men’s higher fertility intentions and ideals. 
The descriptive section showed women’s egalitarian attitudes to be related to 
higher fertility aspirations, particularly among mothers. In the multivariate analysis, 
women’s egalitarian attitudes exhibited a positive but non-significant association with 
higher fertility intentions and this was stronger among mothers. No evident association 
was found between gender attitudes and higher fertility ideals. 
 
Table 3: The impact of gender attitudes on the intention to have a(nother) 
child, to have three or more children, and on personal ideals of three 
or more children, Finnish 0 and 1 parity men and women aged 25-39 
  
Intention to have a 
child, childless 
respondents 
Intention to have 
another child, one-
child respondents 
Intention to have 3+ 
children 
Personal ideal of 3+ 
children 
Traditional 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Intermediate .733 .714 .473** .610* Men 
Egalitarian 1.206 .727 .893 .712 
Traditional 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Intermediate 1.552 .953 1.239 .938 Women 
Egalitarian 1.224 1.019 1.454 1.157 
 
Note: For values of the coefficients from the Model III controlling for structural and attitudinal variables, see Tables A2 and A3. 
 
 
The higher childbearing intentions of egalitarian men in the descriptive statistics 
could have been presumed to stem partly from them living in a union more often than 
traditional men. However, the impact of egalitarian gender attitudes on men’s intentions 
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did not change markedly when we controlled for partnership. By contrast, inclusion of 
partnership status into the models diminished the positive impact of intermediate gender 
attitudes on women’s fertility intentions (Table A2). The lower parenthood intentions 
among egalitarian and traditional women are thus partly related to a higher proportion 
of them living alone. 
We were interested in whether strong family orientation and low work orientation 
would raise fertility intentions independently of gender attitudes. Indeed, strong family 
orientation correlated consistently and significantly with men’s and women’s intentions 
to have a first child (Table A2). Orientation towards work had an inversed U-shape 
association with the intention to start childbearing for both sexes. People with high 
career ambitions, but interestingly also those who do not consider work very important, 
are less likely to opt for parenthood compared to those with intermediate attitudes to the 
importance of work. As expected, family orientation (as well as other ideational 
variables) exhibits no significant association with the intention to have a second child.  
Family orientation also affected plans of third or subsequent children (Table A3). 
Strong family orientation correlates positively with 3+ parity intentions for both sexes, 
and with high fertility ideals among men. While traditional gender role attitudes have an 
ambivalent, non-significant impact on women’s 3+ aspirations, strong family 
orientation shows an unequivocal linear effect. 
Strong work orientation decreased intentions to become a parent among both men 
and women (Table A2) and was associated with lower fertility expectations among 
women (Table A3).  
Partnership status appears to have almost no effect when we examine higher 
fertility intentions. This is plausible since for many young adults in our data the 
decision to have the third child (or more than three) is still distant and less dependent on 
structural barriers than the decision to have the (next) child in the near future. 
We also found a statistically significant interaction effect of education and gender 
attitudes on the fertility intentions of childless respondents (results not shown). 
Educational attainment moderated the impact of gender attitudes on parenthood 
intentions so that egalitarian attitudes increased parenthood intentions among men with 
low and middle level education. By contrast egalitarian academic men had lower 
fatherhood intentions. The inversed U-shape relation between childbearing and gender 
role attitudes among childless women (Table 3) was evident among women with low or 
middle level education. Among academic women traditional gender attitudes increased 
parenthood intentions when compared to women with intermediate or egalitarian 
attitudes. 
In sum, we found some evidence that egalitarian attitudes increase men’s risk to 
become a father when controlling for structural and ideational factors, although 
traditional attitudes also slightly raised that risk and neither result was statistically 
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significant (Q1). The impact of gender attitudes is stronger for overall fertility desires 
(Q2), and here we found a U-shaped curve among men but not among women: 
compared to both traditional and egalitarian men, intermediate men desire large families 
significantly less often. As expected, the impact of gender ideology (and other 
ideational factors) was discernible both in the transition to parenthood and regarding 
plans to have three or more children, but least pronounced concerning the transition to a 
second child, which is a very common event in contemporary Finland. Separating 
family values from gender equality shows that both have an independent effect, with the 
former being a stronger and more consistent variable except regarding men’s 3+ 
fertility intentions (Q3). 
 
 
7. Discussion  
The ongoing discussion on men, gender equity, and fertility involves many different 
views and approaches. Theories of the incomplete gender revolution suggest that gender 
equity should today boost fertility, particularly in societies where the equality is 
reaching into families (Goldscheider and Waite 1991; McDonald 2000a and 2000b; 
Puur et al. 2008). Other scholars claim that for different reasons, such as the double 
burden of egalitarian men or the pro-family values of traditional men, men favouring 
gender equity will probably have fewer children than other men do (Westoff and 
Higgins 2009). Finally, previous studies have found that both traditional and egalitarian 
gender attitudes can contribute to higher fertility. A clear role division between the 
spouses, whether egalitarian or polarised, may improve their ‘team work’ and facilitate 
everyday coping, while “transitional couples struggle most with the balance between 
work and family” (Torr and Short 2004:123). 
How do attitudes toward gender equity shape the fertility intentions of men and 
women in Finland, a country well into the second phase of the so-called gender 
revolution? We have analysed fertility ideals and intentions among adult Finnish men 
and women with no or only one child. Inspired by the recent debate on men’s fertility 
intentions and gender equality, we wanted to use broader measurements of gender 
equality and to pay special attention to the independent contributions of work and 
family orientation alongside gender equity.  
Our results showed that men’s gender attitudes were in some cases related to the 
intention to have the first child, although these associations did not reach statistical 
significance. Support for gender equality was associated with higher fertility intentions 
among childless men. By contrast, women with intermediate gender equity attitudes 
were more likely than other women to opt for parenthood.  
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The impact of gender ideology significantly influenced men’s overall fertility 
ideals and plans, so that traditional men were more likely and men with intermediate 
attitudes least likely to wish for and plan many children. 
Thus the evidence from Finland presented here gives some slight support for Puur 
et al. (2008), in the sense that egalitarian men appear most eager to become fathers. 
Particularly, when compared to intermediate men, egalitarian men had higher 
parenthood intentions as well as overall fertility expectations. However, traditional 
attitudes also clearly boost men’s fertility ideals in the direction found by Westoff and 
Higgins (2009). Although Finland can be said to be a country relatively far into the 
second gender revolution, with developed family-friendly social policies promoting 
paternal involvement in child care, traditional men still favour having children more 
than other men do.  
The stronger effect found for egalitarian values by Puur et al. (2008) than in our 
study (and others) may, however, be due to different measurements. As the authors 
acknowledge in their response to Westoff and Higgins (Goldscheider, Oláh, and Puur 
2010), some of their questions used for measuring gender egalitarianism probably 
measured what we have here called family orientation. This would be especially true for 
the statements “Family life often suffers because men concentrate too much on their 
work” and “For a man the job should be more important than the family”. We 
controlled for family and work orientation and found that egalitarian attitudes still 
raised intentions to become a parent. Family orientation, in turn, correlated consistently 
and significantly with men’s and women’s intentions to have a first child, and with 
men’s higher fertility intentions. The independent effect of both gender attitudes and of 
family orientation on men’s fertility intentions remained when controlling for other 
ideational and structural variables.  
As in many previous studies, the impact of gender attitudes depended on what 
fertility component was examined. Gender attitudes had more impact on higher fertility 
intentions (among men) than on the proximate and more concrete decision to have the 
next child. As such, studies of mean expected or ideal numbers of children may detect 
stronger relations between equality and fertility than those analysing parity-specific 
childbearing behaviour. We also suggest that gender egalitarianism may influence the 
number of children, especially through the timing of parenthood. While egalitarian men 
are almost as likely as traditional men to opt for parenthood and large families, they 
may start having children at a later stage than other men do. 
Our study has several limitations. An obvious shortcoming is our data only refers 
to men and women at parity 0 and 1. However, this sample reflects the family structure 
of the majority of the age group in question. Another limitation is that we did not study 
actual fertility outcomes. General family size preferences are known to be relatively 
weak predictors of subsequent behaviour, especially when respondents are asked about 
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preferences concerning several parities beyond their current one. Nevertheless, in order 
to understand how gender attitudes relate to fertility intentions, the inclusion of more 
abstract ideals and plans is warranted. In our next study we hope to be able to link these 
survey data with childbearing outcomes of respondents through birth register data. 
To conclude, our findings indicate a tentative U-shaped association between 
gender attitudes and fertility among Finnish men. Traditional but also egalitarian 
attitudes raise men’s fertility intentions, especially related to above-average numbers of 
children. Among Finnish women the impact of gender attitudes is smaller and more 
ambiguous. Unlike most other previous research, we found that Finnish women with 
traditional gender attitudes did not wish for more children than did other women. 
Instead, mothers with egalitarian values showed signs of having higher childbearing 
ideals and intentions. This can be interpreted as support for the claim that equally 
sharing couples more often have a second child (Torr and Short 2004). In regression 
analyses gender attitudes did not affect women’s childbearing intentions. Women’s 
educational level, income, family, and work orientation were more important for their 
fertility intentions than were their gender role attitudes. Gender equity may thus affect 
men’s and women’s fertility aspirations in contradictory ways. We should also 
remember that egalitarian Finnish fathers of one child were not exceptionally eager to 
have two or more children. Factors not included in this analysis, such as personality 
traits and partnership satisfaction, which may interact with gender equality, may also be 
at play here and would merit inclusion in future studies. 
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APPENDIX I – Summary Statistics  
Table A1: Summary statistics of 25-39-year old Finnish men and women with 
no children or only one child, Finnish Well-being Survey 2008 
 Men Women 
 Frequency % Frequency % 
Yes 415 59.8 676 62.2 Intention to have (more) 
children No 279 40.2 410 37.8 
Yes 115 22.4 201 25.4 Intention to have 3+ 
children No 398 77.6 589 74.6 
Yes 139 22.8 262 27.5 Personal ideal to have 3+ 
children No 471 77.2 690 72.5 
Traditional 177 25.5 307 28.3 
Intermediate 334 48.1 537 49.5 Gender role attitudes 
Egalitarian 183 26.4 242 22.3 
25-29 256 36.9 492 45.3 
30-34 239 34.4 316 29.1 Age 
35-39 199 28.7 278 25.6 
0 352 51.2 541 50.2 Number of own children 
1 335 48.8 536 49.8 
No union 206 29.7 307 28.3 Partnership 
Living in union 488 70.3 778 71.7 
Low (ISCED 3) 287 41.5 292 27.0 
Middle (ISCED 4/5B) 211 30.5 427 39.5 Education 
High (ISCED 5A/6) 193 27.9 364 33.5 
Lowest q. 887 e/mth 23.9 860 e/mth 24.4 
2nd 1461 e/mth 23.5 1449 e/mth 28.7 
3rd 1856 e/mth 31.4 1845 e/mth 29.3 
Highest q. 2678 e/mth 17.9 2716 e/mth 13.4 
Mean net income in 
household income 
quartiles 
(Proportion of respondents 
in the quartile) Missing - 3.3 - 4.2 
0 64 9.5 90 8.6 
1 297 44.2 456 43.8 Number of own siblings 
2+ 311 46.3 495 47.6 
Important/In-between 181 26.2 390 36.1 Religion 
Not important 510 73.8 691 63.9 
Low 180 26.6 312 29.5 
Intermediate 388 57.4 599 56.6 Work orientation 
High 108 16.0 147 13.9 
Weak 386 56.8 765 71.4 Family orientation 
Strong 293 43.2 307 28.6 
Total  694 100.0 1086 100.0 
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APPENDIX II – Logistic Regression  
The tables can be read in the following way. The first set (bivariate estimates) presents 
the non-controlled effects of all variables. Next, model I produces the combined 
estimates of the ideational variables. Model II (in the same column as model I and 
below it) shows the combined estimates of the structural variables. Third, model III 
incorporates both ideational and structural variables in the same model. From the point 
of view of this paper the third model allows us to examine the impact of the gender 
attitude variable when the impact of other variables is controlled for.  
 
Table A2: Logistic regression models analysing the risk of intention to have the 
first child (among childless persons) and the second child (among 
one-child parents). Finnish 0 and 1 parity men and women aged  
25-39 years, Finnish Well-being Survey 2008 
1st child 2nd child Men 
Bivariate Model I Model III Bivariate Model I Model III 
Traditional 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Intermediate .755 .709 .733 .774 .836 .714 
Gender role 
attitudes 
Egalitarian 1.005 1.156 1.206 .753 .779 .727 
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 1.490 1.904 1.761 .694 .732 .778 Siblings 
2+ 1.722 1.863 1.675 1.019 1.061 1.155 
Important/in-
between 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Religion 
Not important .851 .955 .868 1.093 1.013 .979 
Intermediate 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Weak .546** .565* .606 .863 .823 .621 Work-orientation 
Strong .683 .556+ .639 1.193 1.108 1.222 
Weak 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Family values 
Strong 1.661* 1.737* 2.326** 1.242 1.144 1.181 
   Model II   Model II  
25-29 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
30-34 .842 .836 .769 .709 .672 .664 Age 
35-39 .469*** .539** .446* .279*** .295*** .372** 
No partner 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Partnership 
Partner 4.007*** 3.765*** 4.588*** 5.651*** 5.572*** 9.013*** 
Low 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle 1.333 1.063 .915 .986 1.234 1.264 Education 
University 1.811* 1.641+ 1.844+ 1.372 1.673+ 1.212 
Lowest quartile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Second quartile 1.793+ 1.590 1.449 1.497 1.612 1.517 
Third quartile 2.043* 1.744+ 1.644 .696 .798 .543 
Highest quartile 1.644 1.616 1.508 .533+ .645 .519 
Household income 
Missing inf. 1.537 1.773+ 2.074 .525+ .579 .692 
 
Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
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Table A2: (Continued) 
1st child 2nd child Women 
Bivariate Model I Model III Bivariate Model I Model III 
Traditional 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Intermediate 1.585* 1.730* 1.552 .883 .959 .953 
Gender role 
attitudes 
Egalitarian 1.041 1.079 1.224 .848 1.064 1.019 
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 .741 .675 .715 1.303 1.341 1.359 Siblings 
2+ .921 .765 .792 1.465 1.395 1.510 
Important/in-
between 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Religion 
Not important .904 .871 .571* .775 .829 1.004 
Intermediate 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Weak .555** .522** .641+ 1.193 1.080 .986 Work-orientation 
Strong .653+ .613+ .618+ .637 .675 .755 
Weak 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Family values 
Strong 2.235** 2.443** 2.877** .993 .975 1.075 
   Model II   Model II  
25-29 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
30-34 .438*** .386*** .397*** .641+ .610* .644+ Age 
35-39 .156*** .127*** .152*** .161*** .164*** .167*** 
No partner 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Partnership 
Partner 2.785*** 2.680*** 3.220*** 2.073** 1.825* 2.195** 
Low 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle 1.198 .928 .844 1.508+ 1.633* 1.766* Education 
University 1.353 .838 .827 1.716* 2.332** 2.871*** 
Lowest quartile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Second quartile 1.253 1.298 1.253 .829 .818 .767 
Third quartile 1.946** 2.263** 2.265** .596* .550* .557+ 
Highest quartile 1.611 2.906** 2.669* .583+ .600 .594 
Household income 
Missing inf. .494 .625 .665 1.187 1.033 1.391 
 
Notes: p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
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Table A3: Logistic regression models analysing the risk of intention and ideal to 
have 3+ children. Finnish 0 and 1 parity men and women aged 25-39 
years, Finnish Well-being Survey 2008 
3+ Intention 3+ Ideal Men 
Bivariate Model I Model III Bivariate Model I Model III 
Traditional 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Intermediate .462*** .483** .473** .514** .618* .610* 
Gender role 
attitudes 
Egalitarian .750 .963 .893 .543* .742 .712 
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 2.098+ 1.970 2.142 1.082 1.234 1.370 Siblings 
2+ 3.292** 3.298** 3.624* 2.388* 2.517* 2.736* 
Important/in-
between 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Religion 
Not important .657+ .651+ .629+ .617* .621* .561** 
Intermediate 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Weak 1.052 1.084 1.178 .831 .795 .852 Work-orientation 
Strong 1.252 1.281 1.205 1.469 1.280 1.188 
Weak 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Family values 
Strong 1.559* 1.578* 1.566+ 1.832*** 1.699** 1.724** 
   Model II   Model II  
25-29 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
30-34 .535** .469*** .539* .716 .674+ .670+ Age 
35-39 .324*** .307*** .325*** .521** .503** .525* 
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Number of children 
0 1.428*** 1.687* 1.501 1.386+ 1.731* 1.458 
No partner 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Partnership 
Partner 1.133 .830 1.158 .930 .685 .791 
Low 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle .983 1.113 1.014 1.086 1.223 1.085 Education 
University 1.738** 1.920** 2.009* 1.944** 2.147*** 2.035** 
Lowest quartile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Second quartile .602+ .629 .626 .521* .540* .560* 
Third quartile .619+ .664 .579+ .617* .599* .528* 
Highest quartile .717 .842 .673 .689 .651 .603 
Household income 
Missing inf. .875 .872 .863 1.122 .842 .452 
 
Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
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Table A3: (Continued) 
3+ Intention 3+ Ideal Women 
Bivariate Model I Model III Bivariate Model I Model III 
Traditional 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Intermediate 1.052 1.146 1.239 .891 .951 .938 
Gender role 
attitudes 
Egalitarian .950 1.254 1.454 .955 1.170 1.157 
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1 .943 .922 .868 1.003 .954 1.015 Siblings 
2+ 1.948* 1.961* 1.975* 1.674+ 1.615+ 1.686+ 
Important/in-between 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Religion 
Not important .606** .591** .600** .508*** .532*** .543** 
Intermediate 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Weak 1.250 1.267 1.186 1.283 1.291 1.227 Work-orientation 
Strong .505* .507* .571+ .686 .677 .690 
Weak 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Family values 
Strong 1.451* 1.372+ 1.156 1.211 1.163 1.121 
   Model II   Model ll  
25-29 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
30-34 .487*** .412*** .434*** .575*** .519*** .514** Age 
35-39 .101*** .100*** .070*** .285*** .280*** .241*** 
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Number of 
children 0 1.711*** 1.990*** 1.761** 1.341* 1.614** 1.433* 
No partner 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Partnership 
Partner 1.393+ 1.092 1.210 1.071 .917 .952 
Low 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Middle 1.425+ 1.846** 2.178*** 1.666** 1.998*** 2.097*** Education 
University 1.208 1.768* 1.888*** 1.591* 2.186*** 2.170*** 
Lowest quartile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Second quartile .837 .802 .865 .882 .926 .972 
Third quartile .611* .621* .617+ .620* .614* .636* 
Highest quartile .393*** .531+ .640 .551* .616+ .783 
Household income 
Missing inf. .809 1.079 .943 .757 .870 .851 
 
Notes: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001. 
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